1. Another reason why the F-35 is a bad deal.

    The F-35 aircraft designs will not meet specification nor the operational requirements laid down in the JSF JORD (Joint Operational Requirements Document) by significant degrees, noting that these operational requirements and resulting specifications, themselves, were predicated on the capabilities of reference legacy Soviet Cold War threats from an era past (not for the 21st Century anti-access/area denial emerging threats) and subsequently subjected to the illogical and deeply flawed process known as CAIV (Cost As and Independent Variable).

    The designs of all three JSF variants are presenting with critical single points of failure while even the most basic elements of aircraft design (e.g. weight, volume, aerodynamics, structures, thermal management, electrical power, etc.) will almost certainly end up in what Engineers call “Coffin Corner”.

    In essence, the unethical Thana Marketing strategy is using to sell the JSF, along with the acquisition malpractice of concurrency in not only development, the production and testing but the actual designs of the JSF variants, themselves, have resulted in the JSF marketeers writing cheques that the aircraft designs and JSF Program cannot honour.

  2. The F-35 is sh*t. I have never thought well of this aircraft. It’s not good at any of the roles Lockheed Martin wants it to preform. For example, they want to replace the A-10 with the F-35 and that to me is the most bullsh*t idea ever, the A-10 is built for CAS, and it is not possible to use a multirole aircraft for CAS. Replacing the A-10 with the F-35 is like replacing a B-52 with a Cessna. Also, it does not work as a fighter, it has a fat body and tiny wings and no LEX to improve lift, therefore, it cannot turn, or climb. The best it can do is pull an aileron roll, a useless maneaver in combat. It also lacks range. Furthermore, the F-35 is to replace the best multirole fighter in the world, the F/A-18 Hornet, but once again cannot because the F-18 has great rang, large weapon ability, wonderful maneaverability, and is great at both air to air and air to ground ops in one mission. The F-35 can’t replace the F-18, or the CF-18(the Canadian version) because the CF-18 has to operate over vast areas of tundra close to the North Pole, but the CF-18 has two engines, and therefore can come home on one if the other fails. The F-35 is a single engine aircraft so if one goes down, and it will because all engines fail no matter how advanced they are, the F-35 pilot will have to ditch his/her aircraft and all of a sudden there goes $130 million and possibly a pilot. In conclusion, the pentigone is willing to spend 1/2 trillion dollars on a 5th generation aircraft that is worse then it’s 4th generation predecessors. Wtf??

  3. Project for Nuclear Awareness in Philadelphia fully supports this petition and the coalition’s larger goals. We have started a campaign called the Nuclear Budget Campaign that prioritizes human needs over the nuclear weapons industry by breaking down the federal costs of nuclear weapons by state and comparing the bloated budget to localized human needs by state… http://www.pnausa.org

  4. The most unbelievable thing to me is that the government and Lockheed-Martin seem to think that the F-35 can replace the A-10. More planes will crash and more pilots will die, which means more taxpayer dollars wasted. Many of Lockheed-Martin’s planes are fantastic, such as the C-130J Super Hercules and the F-16. The F-35 Lightning II is a terrible plane, a disgrace to the original P-38 lighting.

  5. I also doubt to see new price ever coming down to $95M for the F-35A; $102M for the F-35B and $116M for the F-35C.

    The actual F-35 unit costs are today multiples of what Lockheed Martin, The Pentagon, USAF, USN and USMC says they will be. If you think it is reasonable to expect them to plummet to the $85 million or whatever the price Lockheed glibly promises (thanks to the ubiquitous “learning curve” and other manipulations), please consider a somewhat different analysis, also in Time magazine, available here.


    The cost estimates in the NDAA for the cheapest version of the F-35, the Air Force’s F-35A, are the following. (Note these costs as just for production and do not include R&D.)

    The 2014 procurement cost for 19 F-35As will be $2.989 billion. However, we need to add to that the “long lead” money for the 2014 buy that was appropriated in 2013; that was $293 million, making a total of $3.282 billion for 19 aircraft in 2014. The math for unit cost comes to $172.7 million for each aircraft.

    To be fully accurate, however, we should add the additional procurement money authorized for “modification of aircraft” for F-35As for 2014; that means $158 million more, bringing the total unit production cost to $181 million per copy or higher.

    None of that includes the 2014 R&D bill for the F-35A; that was $816 million; calculate that in if anyone wants to find out further costs.

    The Marine Corps and Navy versions are a little pricier.

    For the Marines F-35B, or STOVL, model, the authorized 2014 buy is six (6) aircraft for $1.267 billion in 2014 procurement, $106 million in 2013 long lead money, and $147 million in 2014 aircraft procurement modifications. That calculates to $252.3 million for each one.

    For the Navy’s F-35C, carrier-capable (but not yet), model, we get four (4) aircraft for $1.135 billion, plus $32 million in long lead, plus $31 million in modifications. That means $299.5 million for each one.

  6. Col Michael W. Pietrucha, USAF, wrote a 24 page article in Air and Space Power Journal, “The Comanche and the Albatross: About Our Neck Was Hung”. He has got a good point why the F-35 must be cancelled now.

    The F-35 is based on a belief that radar low observability will remain effective against future air defence threats. Although true for the F-117 against Iraq’s Kari system in 1991, stealthiness is unlikely to remain so against an adversary that has two decades to prepare for US stealth fighters, which have much higher infrared, visual, and emitter signatures than did the F-117.

    Outside China and Russia, no massive threat from an advanced integrated air defence system exists. Moreover, China is a poor example of a threat to cite if someone is trying to justify a short-ranged fighter with limited payload flown from island bases within range of overwhelming missile attack. Losses of US aircraft have mainly been helicopters since the Vietnam war and fixed wing losses were not shot down.

    Only Russia and China can pose the kind of anti-access, area denial (A2AD) environment that justifies a massive investment in stealth.

    These facts make the risk calculation involved with prioritising stealth over performance, range, and weapons loadout inherently suspect—and the F-35 might well be the first modern fighter to have substantially less performance than its predecessors.

    This is Col Michael W. Pietrucha’s Proposal.

    • Maintain a limited number of F-35As (those already purchased) as a replacement for the capabilities lost upon retirement of the F-117; (Well, to me the limited number of F-35As need to be sent to AMARC and to be recycled)

    • Create a modernised Tactical Air Force fleet consisting of a high-low mix of modernised F-15 and F-16 legacy fighters, light attack aircraft, and multi-purpose jet trainer / attack aircraft;

    • Recover some “sunk cost” of the F-35 program by using advanced systems to modernise legacy fighters, in effect fielding fifth-generation systems in fourth-generation airframes;

    • Restore the Air Force’s SEAD/EW (Suppression of Enemy Air. Defences – Electronic warfare) fighters and crews;

    • Expand the service’s global reach capabilities by providing deployable Tactical Air Force assets that can operate from short, rough airstrips on a logistical shoestring

    • Increase the number of absorbable cockpits to the point where the Air Force can augment the inventory of fighter/attack aviators to meet requirements;

    • Invest in affordable, exportable “light combat aircraft” derived from Air Education and Training Command’s T-X program;

    • Allow the Air Guard to maintain its position as the operational reserve and “relief valve” for experienced fighter/attack aviators while recapitalizing its portion of the CAF; and

    • Build a Tactical Air Force that can meet the nation’s demands for air-power capabilities even in the face of increasing fuel costs and decreasing budget.

  7. Well, it is too impossible to design a single “do all” fighter/bomber/close air support aircraft and expect it to do ANY of those tasks well.

    Can the F-35 perform air superiority? The very clear answer is no. Gen Mike Hostage (also a staunch supporter of the F-35) claims that the F-35 is not built as an air superiority platform, it needs the F-22 or the F-15.

    Remember the F-35A was suppose to be designed primarily to support ground forces on the battlefield with some self defence capabilities and is not suitable for the developing regional environment. The aircraft is unsuited for air superiority, you can’t have an aircraft that has tiny wings with very high wing loading of 108 lb/ft² (when fully loaded) of not being able to have adequate manoeuvrability of defeating and avoiding enemy fighters, missiles and ground fire. It also unsuitable for deep interdiction bombing and cruise missile defence due to limited range/endurance, very limited weapons load and limited supersonic speed. Also the F-35 can’t do close air support mission. I reckon one of the test office’s conclusion is misleading. The vulnerability has decreased 25 percent focused on a small area “if the aircraft is hit.” The probability is actually high, classified number. This means the overall impact to aircraft’s survivability is high, higher than 0.5 percent.

    Why is the survivability higher than 0.5 percent?

    To restore a 2 lb safety valve system part of 43 lb (20 kg) equipment will increase more weight on the F-35 affecting the aircraft’s flight performance parameters, making it draggier that can’t turn, can’t climb, can’t run to escape enemy fighters/guns/missiles, terrible acceleration, limited range/endurance and doesn’t have enough motor for the weight. Lockheed Martin has done very little with major safety precautions on the F-35 which is a very delicate aeroplane that makes it more vulnerable (if flown at low altitudes when performing close air support missions) from a high-explosive round such as .22 Rifle, or any form of gunfire that will disable or destroy an engine and fuel tank and the F-35 has no armour cockpit tub to protect the pilot if hit by a bullet or fragment. The F-35 doesn’t carry flame-retardant foam in its fuel tanks because the foam displaces fuel. The fuel tanks are not equipped with self-sealing membranes to plug bullet or shrapnel holes. As its limitations are inherent to the design, they cannot be altered by incremental upgrades.

    The F-35 is built for a dumb idea of not be able to perform anything. It is just a super failure that is going to weaken any nations frontline of defence.

    • “What about the USN’s F-35C variant which has longer wings and be able to turn better than the F-35A/B?”.

      The F-35C will still have the same high wing loading as does the A/B models, which won’t have adequate manoeuvrability and poor thrust to weight ratio.

    • Some corrections of the wing loading for the F-35.

      The aircraft will have a very high wing loading of 108 lb/ft² (when empty) and 176 lb/ft² (when fully loaded).

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